OSCE Conference
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell Roundtable with European Editors
04/29/2004Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
Roundtable with European Editors:
Renat Abdullin, Interfax (Russia)
Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany)
Ramon Perez-Maura, Diario ABC (Spain)
Emanuele Novazio, La Stampa (Italy)
Véronique Soule, Liberation (France)
Robert Thomson, The Times (U.K.)
Berlin, Germany
QUESTION: We thought we’d ask one national self-interested question each first.
SECRETARY POWELL: Anything you wish. Let me just say thank you for joining me this morning and I appreciate it and I am very pleased to be back in Berlin, and on this particular occasion to be attending this important conference on anti-Semitism. It is unfortunate we have to have a conference on anti-Semitism, but it turns out to be a necessity. It’s the second conference in a row that we’ve had on this subject. So many decades after the end of the Third Reich anti-Semitism is still alive in the world and I want to thank the German government for hosting this conference and my colleague, Joschka Fischer for serving as the principal host and also the OSCE under the chairmanship of Solomon Passy, the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria for pulling them altogether. I think it has been a successful conference, ending up in a declaration that is not only hortatory but lays out some action to be taken by the OSCE to follow up. So I am pleased to have been here to represent the United States and President Bush. And with that I’ll open it. You are the maitre’d of this, Robert?
REPORTER: Well, I’m the concierge. [laughter]
QUESTION: So, I’d like to ask you my question now, about France. Of course there were a lot of disagreements with France about Iraq. But the relations are improving and I wanted to know what you expect now from France because there will be a sovereignty on the 30th of June and that’s what French leaders wanted. Do you expect, for example, that French accept to send troops to Iraq and take part, for example, to the international force which would give security to the United Nations force in Iraq? What is your expectation from France today?
SECRETARY POWELL: First of all I am pleased that all of my European colleagues, especially my French colleagues, understand that this is the time for us to come together and put the differences of last year into the past where they belong and where they are, and to work together on a political process for Iraq and to help with the reconstruction of Iraq.
France has always been looking forward to the return of sovereignty to the Iraqi people. That’s been the French position for some time, and it is about to happen. What I would like France to do to assist us as we move forward is to be supportive of an U.N. resolution when we put one before the United Nations in the not too distant future that will recognize the interim government, and encourage others in the international community to support that interim government financially, and for those who are able to do so, with military forces. I don’t know what the French government might do with respect to the kind of support they would provide. I’m not expecting any French troops, but there might be other things that France would be able to do.
We will have a need for the protection of U.N. personnel in the country, in order to have that vital presence of the U.N. that we’ve all talked about and everybody has encouraged. We will need security for the U.N. electoral officials who will be going throughout the country to register people and to get ready for the elections at the beginning of next year. And I would hope that all nations that have an interest in helping the Iraqi people might consider making a contribution to that part of our effort of providing security for the U.N. I am not sure whether France would be willing to do that or not, but I hope they would consider it.
QUESTION: The future government of Iraq, do you think it will have full responsibility or limited responsibility and if not, does it mean that it is going to have limited responsibility in Iraq, and the question is, what’s the American attitude to the idea of holding an international conference on Iraq? As far as I know this idea is supported by the Russian authorities. Thank you.
SECRETARY POWELL: Keep in mind that this interim government is really a caretaker government until the end of the year, the beginning of next year, when we can have an election for a national assembly and that national assembly can pick a transitional government. We want this interim government to exercise as much sovereignty as it is capable of exercising. The CPA, Ambassador Bremer, will go away. So this government that currently exists in the form of Ambassador Bremer will not be there any longer. Instead, there will be an American ambassador representing our interests just as our ambassador represents our interests any where in the world.
Arrangements have to be made with this new interim government with respect to security, with respect to the use of the reconstruction money that we have, and to some extent then, they will have to yield back some of their authority to those of us who are in Iraq performing specific services. For example, this interim government will not have the capacity to defend itself and to defend the territory of Iraq. There will be large military force there; a multi-national force and that multi-national force must be under its own commanders and under an American commander. So to that extent, the interim government does not have sovereignty over those troops. This should not strike people as that unusual. We had troops here in Germany for many, many years that were under military command of American commanders. Nevertheless, Germany was a fully sovereign nation. We have had similar arrangements in Korea for many years. So the people should not find that awkward.
We will make practical arrangements with the new interim government with respect to what we need to be able to be free to do, and what sovereignty we need them to understand they have, and what sovereignty they have to constrain the use of because of our needs for free access to all of the military forces of Iraq and the coalition in order to be able to secure them. So I don’t think it will be difficult to work out these kinds of arrangements.
The key thing, though, is that when the Iraqi people now look to the government, they will not be looking to Ambassador Bremer; they will not be looking to Ambassador Negroponte. They will be looking to their president, their prime minister, their deputy vice presidents and to their own cabinet ministers when they have questions that they want answered. When they want to know about how the elections are going to be held, let them look to their leaders and not to a coalition divisional authority commander. Our ambassador will be very important, very influential we hope, but nevertheless he will be an ambassador, not the government. With respect to Russia.
QUESTION: an international conference?
SECRETARY POWELL: Minister Lavrov and I have had conversations on this. As you know, Mr. Brahimi in his plan provides for, and I’ll get to the question, but in his plan it provides for the convening of a significant group, a large group, of Iraqi citizens representing all sectors of civil society, sometime after the interim government has been created and takes over so that that grouping of Iraqis from civil society can endorse the interim government.
We are also looking at what other endorsements may be appropriate from the international community. Would an international conference be appropriate to provide such endorsement, or is the U.N. resolution sufficient endorsement, since that represents the view of the international community? So we’ve made no decision about the need for an international conference if you had the endorsement in the form of a Security Council resolution, but it is an item that is in open discussion and Sergei Lavrov and I are talking about it on a regular basis.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, first of all, thanks very much for having us this morning.
SECRETARY POWELL: My pleasure.
QUESTION: Let’s broaden the question of your expectations to NATO. Is there a role for NATO? What would be the nature of that role? And how imminent would that role be?
SECRETARY POWELL: I think there is a potential role for NATO. And no NATO member has said there is not. In fact, in the meetings that I have had at NATO over the last year, as this possibility has been discussed, NATO has shown a willingness to consider a potential role. Some nations are more anxious and willing than other nations, but so it is in an alliance of now 26 nations.
What might that role be? It might be provision of a headquarters; it might be provision of additional troops that are not now there from the NATO nations; more NATO nations participating in the provision of troops. To keep in mind, I think the number is 16 of the 26 nations of NATO are now represented in Iraq. They have troops on the ground. Germany has indicated it would not send troops and France has indicated that it would not send troops. So that leaves about another eight or so nations that might be able to send troops. Some of them don’t have troops -- Iceland, for example.
And so I am not expecting that just getting a NATO endorsement would open up a large reservoir of additional troops to go to Iraq. But I think it would be an important signal if NATO were to show that as an alliance and not just as individual members of the alliance, NATO as an alliance, is involved and committed to the future of a democratic Iraq. How it manifests itself: to be determined; discussions are underway now and perhaps something will be ready at the time of the Istanbul NATO summit.
QUESTION: Do you expect a declaration or a commitment or some sort of political statement coming out of that meeting?
SECRETARY POWELL: I don’t think they can get together in Istanbul without saying something about this very, very important issue. I can’t tell you yet what it might be.
QUESTION: How many more British troops would you like to see in Iraq, Mr. Secretary? And do you feel much sympathy for Tony Blair, who day after day is pounded in the British news?
SECRETARY POWELL: Second question (laughter) first. I think Prime Minister Blair has shown enormous courage, and he has demonstrated an enormous commitment to doing the right thing in Iraq. He did not shrink from the challenge. He did not weigh the politics of it all and say, you know, I think this is going to be too hard politically. Prime Minister Blair did what he thought what was right and what was right. And as a result of his strong leadership alongside President Bush and alongside Mr. Aznar, Mr. Berlusconi and Mr. Rasmussen and so many others I could name; Prime Minister Howard, the leadership in Korea, Japan and so many of the other nations of the world, the 30-odd nations. They all came together and they removed a dictator. People should not forget what was accomplished.
When people start talking about quagmires, one thing that is not a quagmire is Saddam Hussein; he’s gone. A horrible man and a horrible regime have been removed. You can debate about weapons of mass destruction all you want and what was there, was not there in the past, but they are not there now, they are not there in the future, and they are not coming back. And you can talk about the depravities of this regime, but there will not be new depravities. No more mass graves, no more oppression.
So a great deal has been accomplished. We are now going through a tough time as we restore order to the country and deal with these thugs and old regime elements and terrorists who have come to make trouble. They will be dealt with. And once they are dealt with, then we can get on with the reconstruction, get on with the political process and people, I think, will be very pleased at that point to see what we have accomplished and nobody will deserve greater credit for that accomplishment than Prime Minister Blair, standing alongside President Bush and the others.
With respect to additional troop commitments; always useful to have more troops in a situation like this. But I wouldn’t deign to suggest what the British might do or might be able to do.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are the United States ready to soften the military attitude in Iraq, especially in civil areas. If this could help to save Italian hostages, the Italian government has more than once said to be ready to make pressures on this point to the U.S. administration.
SECRETARY POWELL: First of all we regret that there are still the hostages and we regret the loss of life, the gentlemen who was murdered, Mr. Quattrocchi I think his name is. You know you have to do everything you can to try to locate the people who have been kidnapped and to rescue them. But at the same time, you have to stand firm against kidnappers and terrorists and be very cautious about any suggestions to compromise, because if you start moving in that direction, then you are essentially saying it’s a good thing to take people, to kidnap them or to seize them, because you can always trade them for something or you can always make use of them in some political way. So we would always listen carefully to anything our Italian colleagues would wish to say to us about this matter. But we are doing everything we can to locate the hostages from all of the nations, not just the Italians, and do what we can to see if we can to gain their freedom. Does that talk to your question?
QUESTION: Yes, and in the pressure, the Italian government said it is ready. Rome is ready to make a particular pressure on your government just--
SECRETARY POWELL: ---particular pressure?
QUESTION: Yes, to American forces in the Administration soften the military action.
SECRETARY POWELL: Military action, like around Fallujah you mean? Well, if you see what we have done for the last almost three weeks now, we have been moving with caution, even though on television you see action and you see firefights taking place. For the most part those firefights have been on the edges of the city in the suburbs and we have been holding back from going in. One, because we don’t want to cause any more loss of life or damage to the city than is absolutely necessary and two, we are asking tribal leaders and civic leaders from the city to appeal to those inside the city to stop what they are doing. So I think we are operating with patience and with prudence, which is what we have been asked to do by our commanders who think it is the best way to do it right now and of course, the Secretary General and the Italian government have also indicated – take our time, be patient. At the end of the day, however, we must restore control to Fallujah. Hopefully it can be done peacefully.
QUESTION: Why do you think the U.S. has a different perception of the huge security and terrorist threats of our days, as opposed to some other countries, especially European countries, and having to in Spain which has also had a serious terrorist attack, not as serious as 9/11, but very serious, too? Why is there such a different view as to how big that threat is and how to react to it?
SECRETARY POWELL: I don’t know that there is that big a difference in view and I think the view, if there is a big difference, is that this gap is closing. Spain for many years thought that its principal terrorist threat was represented by ETA. And Spain has known terrorism for longer than almost any other European nation because of ETA. And then suddenly you had 3/11 and Spain realized that it is not just ETA but it is at risk to the kind of terrorism that other countries have experienced.
Saudi Arabia for a long period of time thought, well, terrorism is very, very bad and it’s terrible, but it doesn’t affect us. And suddenly over the last year Saudi Arabia has discovered it does affect you, and these people respect no religion; they respect no border; they respect no political system. They will go after countries like Saudi Arabia. They will go after Spain; they will go after Italy; they will go after Indonesia; they will go after Australia and I think increasingly, the civilized nations of the world are coming to the realization that this is a problem for the whole world and the whole world has to respond. That’s why there is an increasing success in pulling people together to exchange intelligence information, exchange law enforcement information, coordinate and cooperate more closely with respect to going after these terrorists and making the case to the world that this is something that must be fought by all of us together.
So whatever initial gaps there may have been with the United States responding perhaps more forcefully than anyone else because of what happened to us on 9/11, I think the other nations of the world are now recognizing, hey, this is our problem too. Moscow has had terrorist incidents. Everybody at this table has experienced terrorism in one form or another.
QUESTION: (inaudible) What will be the difference between the multinational force which will be after the 30th of June? The difference between the coalition forces today.. And don’t you believe that maybe you waited too long a time, to go back to ask the United Nations to help you to organize the political transition? Because now of course, this is very late for the situation on the ground is very, very difficult.
SECRETARY POWELL: As a practical matter I am not sure you see a great deal of difference, except that you will that multinational force will be working very closely with the sovereign interim government, and there will no longer be a CPA there. And so I think that in terms of what you see, that will probably be the biggest significant difference -- the close relationship between U.S. forces and the Iraqi interim government and no CPA involved, but the ambassador playing a role.
The suggestion in the second part of your question is that the total solution to the problem is merely to return to sovereignty. My French colleagues have always had the view that we should have found somebody to give sovereignty to long ago. We did not believe that we could find anybody or we agreed in circumstances that would permit that to happen last fall as the French suggested we should do as a solution, and to think that just because we returned sovereignty these thugs and former regime elements and terrorists are going to go away, that is not the case, as much as I wish it were the case.
Returning sovereignty is going to help because it puts an Iraqi face on the situation and the people can look and see, not Americans and not Brits, but Iraqis increasingly in charge of the country and in charge of their destiny. But these people are really bad and they will go after the Iraqi interim government. The thugs - they will go after the Iraqi interim government just as they are going after coalition representatives now.
And so I think an Iraqi interim government, an Iraqi face on it, will improve the environment, but I regret that it probably isn’t the complete solution and we can debate for long periods of time as to whether it might be that much better if we had done it earlier. But we didn’t believe the circumstances were present earlier to do it.
We always wanted the U.N. to play a vital role, that’s why we were anxious to see Sergio de Mello come over last year. Remember, it was with our full backing and blessing that the U.N. came in last year. Sergio’s untimely death at the hands of terrorists, I think set us back and it took us a while to get back on track to work with the U.N. I am pleased we are working with them so closely now and that they are playing a vital role, and Ambassador Brahimi is playing such a vital role.
QUESTION: Do you worry that the battle round Fallujah is taking on an emblematic role in the Arab world—the siege of Fallujah, fighting Arabs holding out of the massed forces of the U.S. troops?
SECRETARY POWELL: It has that image, but it will go away quickly as soon as it’s resolved and it can’t go on indefinitely. It will have to resolve. Let’s hope it is resolved peacefully through the intercession of the tribal sheiks as well as joint patrols between coalition forces and Iraqi forces.
QUESTION: How long can the American public opinion accept the images of coffins and body bags coming back? The Dover test. How far can the Dover test go?
SECRETARY POWELL: I think the American people, no one likes casualties and no one likes body bags; no one likes to see coffins at Dover. But I think the American people have demonstrated over the years that they will accept casualties in the service of a proper cause, a noble cause. So far I think the American people -- even though the numbers go up and down, they drift up and down -- the American people believe in what we are doing. Now when the scenes are not so good for a few days, then the polls will reflect that. But I think the American people are behind what we are doing.
I get this question a great deal from European audiences. Well, you know, the Americans; can you really take casualties? And I just have to remind you – count the number of casualties we took to free Europe twice over the past century and you’ll see if Americans can take casualties or whether we are up to it. Visit our cemeteries in Europe and Americans are up to the task, and we are not people who tend to turn and run as long as the cause is understood and we believe we are doing the right thing. In this case, we are sure we are doing the right thing.
QUESTION: (inaudible) If you want to have a (inaudible) to have a more active role in Iraq, America must be ready to give up the monopoly of decision.
SECRETARY POWELL: We coordinate closely with our friends and allies. We stay in very close touch with Prime Minister Berlusconi, and I am on the phone in a regular basis with Mr. Frattini so they understand what we are doing and they are part of the coalition and express their views openly, and clearly. I could say the same thing with respect to Prime Minister Blair and Mr. Straw, my secretary colleague, who I speak to very, very regularly.
And so I think we have had an open planning process and an open decision process. And the close relationship that has existed between the coalition members represented here -- Great Britain, Italy and Spain -- has been close and open and we have not tried to run a monopoly on it, although we are the largest contributor of the troops and we command the troops and we direct the CPA through Ambassador Bremer, but I can assure you that Ambassador Greenstock in Baghdad has been no shrinking violet in presenting the views of her Majesty’s government. We have tried to be open to all ideas that came from Italy and Spain. Jose Maria Aznar was no shrinking violet either, as I think you will agree. And Ana Palacio, I can assure you, was no shrinking violet, nor was Franco (inaudible).
QUESTION: Excuse me. You changed the doc (inaudible) and moved to the inaudible) on the 4th of May a meeting of four international mediators of the U.S. on the Middle East as far as I know.
SECRETARY POWELL: 4th of May, next week?
QUESTION: On the 4th of May, yes. (Inaudible) and do you agree that now there are serious disagreements between the members of these four, especially after Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has proposed his own plan for -- which contains the Israeli decision to give up the settlements to Gaza completely and this plan as far I know was supported by the American side. Sharon’s representative was in Moscow and he also proposed this plan to Russia (inaudible) and as far as I know the first Russian position was very, very cautious and I’m not sure about European Union, so first question is: This meeting, what do you expect of it? And the other question is -- Mr. Arafat, do you still consider him as a serious partner in the future in the Middle East process?
SECRETARY POWELL: On the last question, no, we do not see Mr. Arafat as a responsible partner. We made this clear in June of 2002 when President Bush gave his speech that we needed to see reform in the Palestinian Authority, we needed to see somebody who could deliver on peace and that’s why we were anxious for the Palestinians to create a position of Prime Minister and to fill that position, which they have done twice now, but the individual who has occupied this position in each instance, first Abu Mazen and then now Abu Alaa, have been constrained once again, by who, by Arafat.
The previous administration, the President Clinton Administration, ran into the same problem with Chairman Arafat, who doesn’t deliver. He is not a reliable partner for peace. For three years I have worked hard to get the peace process started. First with the Mitchell Plan, the Tenet Plan, the Zinni Plan, and we never could get the Palestinians to focus on the simple problem of terrorism and they had to do something to bring terrorism under control and Mr. Arafat never would do that.
So Mr. Sharon finally said a few weeks ago that Mr. Arafat is not a partner for peace; we have no partner (inaudible) have no partner on the Palestinian side, Mr. Sharon said, and therefore, I have to do something unilaterally; I have got to move; I can’t wait forever. And what he did was, he said: I will remove all the settlements from Gaza, some, almost 8,000. Somebody went out [referring to the French reporter’s tape recorder].
FRENCH REPORTER: Excellent
OTHER REPORTER: Franco-American cooperation at the highest levels [laughter]
SECRETARY POWELL: See? All is well. All is well (laughter). Please report this to Michel Barnier. [Laughter]
So he decided he’s going to act unilaterally. What did he do? Pull all eight thousand – seven, eight thousand -- settlements out of Gaza, not destroy the settlements, put them in trust and make the assets ultimately available to the Palestinian people.
For all these years people said, “Get out of the settlements.” That’s what he’s doing. All the settlements in Gaza. And, to make sure it wasn’t an abandonment of the peace process, in our conversations with Mr. Sharon, we made clear to him that this has to ultimately be folded into the Road Map, as part of the process for peace. And final status decisions must still be agreed between the two parties. In the West Bank he’s also agreed to remove four settlements. It’s not the end of it; it’s the beginning of it. How far that will go is a matter to be decided between the two parties.
Now, in order for Mr. Sharon to move down this road, he needed to take into account certain realities about the right of return of Palestinians. And the position that we took, was, Look; reality is that, with a Palestinian state, Palestinians now have a place to go and therefore that’s where we should see them go, and not to Israel. Everybody knows this. This was the basis of previous discussions and negotiations. And so the President simply took note publicly of this reality.
The other reality that everybody knew about and was the basis of all previous negotiations and discussions, was that the armistice line ultimately will have to be adjusted in some manner to take into account the reality of demographic and political changes and what that change line would look like is not for the United States to decide; it must be mutually agreed upon by the two parties - as part of final status discussions. Reality.
So the President in responding to Mr. Sharon’s position, made these points: one, final status issues must be mutually agreed upon by the parties, two, we prejudge nothing; three, let’s take into account these realities of right of return and where the Palestinians will now have a place to go, and what adjustments have to be made to the armistice line, and let’s stop ignoring these realities, let’s accept them. That created a big uproar.
But as I have spoken to Arab leaders in recent weeks, I have said to them, I know that that’s disturbed you, but look at what is in this: Settlements are being removed. What you really ought to be focusing on is- how can the Palestinian Authority get itself ready to take over Gaza with the Israeli settlers and the Israeli Army gone? That’s what you should be focusing on.
At the Quartet meeting next week with the European Union and the Russian Federation and the United Nations and the United States, we will be discussing all these issues. I will be anxious to hear from my Quartet colleagues about it and I hope that we will come out of that meeting with a better understanding of the opportunities that are available now to the Palestinian Authority, and perhaps with a plan as to how we can help the Palestinian Authority get ready to assume responsibility in Gaza - political responsibility and security responsibility in Gaza. I have stayed in close touch with my Quartet colleagues, I speak on a almost daily basis with Kofi Annan, I speak regularly with Sergei Lavrov as well as with the European Union representatives, Javier Solana and now Brian Cowen, presidency of the European Union, the Irish Foreign Minister. I hope we will have a good discussion in New York about these things, next week.
An opportunity has been put before us to move the Middle East process along, before this bold unilateral statement by Prime Minister Sharon, nothing was happening. We were all looking at one another, standing on positions; nobody was taking any chances or any risks. Here is a sudden change; gotten got a lot of attention, a lot of controversy, but there is an opportunity in this controversy that we should seize.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two questions, very brief ones. President Bush placed Iran on the Axis of Evil. Iran has probably potential for both being serious and helpful. How do you assess Iran’s role in the current situation in Iraq and what they do both to stir turmoil and to calm down the situation? They, as you know, before the war and probably after the war, actually until today, public opinion in Europe is negative to the U.S., even hostile. Afterwards a lot people disputed the credibility of the rationale – sir, in hindsight was WMD.... If you go look back today at your presentation at the United Nations in February 2003, feel you somewhat embarrassed, vindicated or still convinced, I’m sure you are convinced, but I’ll ask the question anyhow, that what you said was absolutely correct at the time. This is crucial for the public debate here in Europe.
SECRETARY POWELL: Sure, of course. What I said at the time was the best information that the intelligence community had for me and had for the President. I spent a lot of time on the presentation. Pressed the intelligence community on everything that they had provided to me and to the President. What they gave me and what I presented was consistent with what other intelligence organizations in other countries felt and believed. It was consistent with the pattern of reporting for many years. It was consistent with the information that President Clinton used when he bombed in 1998 because he felt it was necessary. And it was consistent with the simple fact that the U.N. had passed resolution after resolution after resolution after resolution over a period of 12 years, in response to the same intelligence base that we are all working from.
Now in the aftermath of the war, now that we are in there and looking around, there is still no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein had the intention of having such weapons. There is no reason to believe he ever lost that intention. He’s used them before; he realized the value they were to him, to make him more fearful, feared of in the region. Two, we could see from the reports of Dr. Kay and Charlie Duelfer that the infrastructure was being maintained for these kinds of weapons and there were dual use factories and other installations, and if he was ever removed from sanctions and the international pressure ever came off him, there is no doubt in my mind, or frankly the mind of those looking at this, experts looking at this, that he would have gotten right back fully in the business because he was preparing for that. He was keeping the intellectual base and the industrial base together.
The dispute really comes down to whether or not there were actual, existing stockpiles. You know - you can go into a warehouse, open it up, and there is a stack of chemical weapons, or there is a beaker full of biological weapons. We have not found that. And it remains to be seen whether anything like that will be found or whether our information on that aspect of his program was faulty.
But I am confident that when I presented it, it was the best that we had at that time. Intelligence is intelligence - it isn’t fact, it’s what you believe based on what you have been able to find out, and I think that we had honest people working on it. There wasn’t anything that was cooked; I didn’t get it from outside sources, I got it from the intelligence communication. I sat for four nights with the Director of Central Intelligence and his deputy and their best analysts and they said, ‘This is what we think.’ And so therefore, I am not embarrassed, and I feel that I represented the intelligence community and I represented the position of the United States as accurately as we could at the time.
Let’s see, you had about fourteen questions there. Oh yeah, Iran. We watch them carefully. On occasion they are mischievous, on occasion they have played a moderating role, but nevertheless, we have to be exceptionally cautious about a regime of that nature that has always had designs toward Iraq and we are trying to persuade them that this is time for them to play a helpful role, both with respect to Iraq and with respect to Afghanistan, on the other side.
SECRETARY POWELL: Thank you.
